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SUMMARY
The popularity of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), as a way for governments to get 
infrastructure built, continues to grow. But while the public is often led to believe that this 
is because they result in a more efficient use of taxpayer funds and a more streamlined 
process, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the clearest advantage that PPPs offers 
is to politicians, who are able to transfer to private partners the risks of miscalculated 
construction costs and revenue projections (as with a toll road, for example). For taxpayers, 
the deals can often work out worse than if the government had simply pursued a fixed-
price design-build Public Sector Alternative (PSA) arrangement.
Even from the very start of the process, there are often a limited number of private consortia 
equipped to bid on major PPPs, which already leads to the potential for bidders to build 
in higher profits, and thus, higher costs for taxpayers. Nor are these private consortia 
oblivious to the risks they assume; they must therefore build into their bid an effective 
“insurance premium” to account for unforeseen delays and increased costs. The use of 
private debt to finance construction further inflates prices over a government’s lower cost 
of capital. 
To an incumbent government, a key advantage of PPPs is the ability to avoid upfront costs, 
and let the private consortium arrange financing until the project is complete, allowing 
politicians to take the credit for new infrastructure while passing future maintenance and 
operating costs off onto future politicians, taxpayers and/or users. This, however, only 
provides both the incentive and bookkeeping artifice — since costs are incurred off the 
government’s current balance sheet — for governments to build more infrastructure than 
might otherwise be justified.
Advocates of PPP would argue that one clear benefit PPPs do offer the public is an 
impressive record of bringing in projects on time and on budget. It is true that the 
inflexibility of contracts and the financial risk transferred to the private partners have a 
powerful effect in keeping projects on track. However, the yardsticks by which the on-time 
† 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2015 Urban Policy Program Symposium, held at The School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary, June 2015. We would like to thank participants for their helpful comments and suggestions, 
especially Jack Mintz. We would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
and on-budget criteria are measured are typically flawed. The “start dates” of PPPs are marked after 
the conclusion of a lengthy negotiation and project-planning process between a government and a 
private consortium, making project completions seem more efficient than they really are. Meanwhile, 
the estimated cost of a project has a tendency to increase during that preliminary process. In other 
words, the delay and cost inflation that so often characterize traditional PSAs are not magically 
eliminated in a PPP: they just tend to occur prior to the first shovel breaking ground, rather than 
incrementally over the course of the project’s construction.
Ultimately, several of the problems common to traditional government PSA projects, and supposedly 
absent from PPP arrangements, are still there, only much harder to discern. The costs can be just 
as high, if not higher than with a fixed-price PSA, the timeframes can be just as lengthy, when the 
entire process is accounted for, and the amount of government resources tied up in the negotiation 
and planning process will often rival that of traditional procurement methods. Furthermore, all those 
risks that are supposedly transferred to private players are never truly transferred: The government 
is always the residual risk holder should the consortium somehow fail. From a policy standpoint, 
the measure of whether PPPs are worthwhile should be based not on whether they come in on 
time or on budget, but whether they increase social value relative to a PSA. There is, currently, no 
convincing evidence that they do.
11. INTRODUCTION
Since their introduction in the U.K. in the 1990s, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have 
been adopted in many countries around the world, including Canada. While the use of PPPs 
waned during the global financial crisis, it has rebounded somewhat as the global economy 
has recovered. 
PPPs procure services for government using private sector capital and expertise. The key 
normative justification for PPPs is that the private sector has stronger incentives to deliver 
services more efficiently and at lower cost than with traditional government procurement. 
PPPs are mostly used to provide and maintain infrastructure, including roads, bridges, 
water and wastewater treatment plants, schools, hospitals and prisons. On occasion, the 
private sector also provides the services that use the infrastructure, such as correctional 
services and clinical services. In Canada, federal, provincial and municipal governments 
have all employed PPPs. For the most part, however, PPPs are primarily contracted with 
provincial governments, mostly in urban areas. 
Globally, governments are attracted to PPPs out of a desire to provide new infrastructure to 
address the so-called “infrastructure deficit.” Between 2004 and 2013, the European Union 
signed PPP contracts with a total capital value of 207 billion euros (US$280.7 billion). 
The European Commission has launched an ambitious “Investment Plan for Europe” that 
encourages large-scale private financing of public infrastructure.1 In North America, by 
2009, $200 billion in investments had been planned or realized through PPPs.2 In the U.S., 
the Obama administration has been considering policy options that would attract private 
capital to finance large infrastructure investments.3 The EU, the OECD and the World Bank 
have developed PPP guidelines for practitioners and are promoting their use.4 Despite the 
interest from many governments in PPPs, there are many unresolved issues: Have PPPs 
generally been successful? Do they provide more social value than traditional procurement? 
Do municipalities face any special issues?
The main purposes of this paper are to discuss the potential theoretical advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs versus traditional government procurement methods and to review 
the evidence on the outcomes of existing PPP contracts. Despite the purported advantages 
of PPPs, there are many reasons why they often do not deliver good social value or live up 
to other expectations. While we focus on Canada, the main issues do not vary by country. 
Therefore we draw upon the global experiences with PPPs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of PPPs and a brief 
history of PPPs in Canada. Section 3 identifies and discusses the theoretical benefits of 
PPPs. Section 4 considers the diverse rationales that governments have put forward to 
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2justify their use of PPPs, that is, the actual or “positive theory” rationales why governments 
use PPPs to deliver infrastructure. Section 5 discusses some of the disadvantages of 
PPPs, including the higher cost of private sector financing and higher transaction costs. 
Section 6 draws on the available evidence to evaluate the performance of PPPs to date. 
Section 7 considers trends in PPPs in Canada and elsewhere, and contains some policy 
recommendations.
2. OVERVIEW OF PPPS
What is a PPP?
A PPP is a long-term contract between a government agency and a consortium of private 
sector firms whereby the consortium provides a range of project services and at least some 
private capital. The private sector partners in a new project typically form a special-purpose 
vehicle (SPV), which is a distinct legal entity formed to deliver the project and limit the 
financial liability of the parent firms.5 In a “classic” PPP, the consortium bundles the 
design, building (i.e., construction), financing, operation and maintenance of new physical 
infrastructure as a “DBFOM” contract. In the U.K., this form of PPP is referred to as a 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). A key feature of a DBFOM is that it enables the purchasing 
government to transfer some risks to the private sector partners, including potentially: the 
risk of construction-cost overruns and delays, the risk that, once operational, the facility 
does not function as contracted and, sometimes, the risk that revenues from user fees or 
user demand do not meet the projected levels. In exchange, the consortium receives either 
(1) an agreed periodic fee from government (an “availability payment”); (2) “shadow tolls” 
payments from government, which vary with usage (a “usage” payment); or (3) it collects 
tolls directly from users. Thus, the consortium generally earns revenue over the contract 
life, typically for 20 to 35 years. In principle, these revenues cover the private sector’s initial 
investment in the project (design, construction and borrowing costs) and operating and 
maintenance costs, plus a profit margin. At the end of the contract, asset ownership reverts 
to the public sector. In a sense the private sector offers the public sector the ability to “rent 
to own,” that is, the public sector pays the private sector an annual rental fee for a specified 
period and then owns the asset at the end of that period.
In practice, PPP contracts vary in the extent to which the private sector engages in all 
DBFOM activities. For highways without tolls, like the Sea-to-Sky Highway in B.C., 
there is no “operator” in the traditional sense, but the private consortium is responsible 
for facility maintenance over the life of the contract. In hospitals and schools, the private 
sector will “operate” the building and may provide some “soft services” like laundry and 
catering. However, the public sector usually retains responsibility for “core” services, such 
as the medical and educational services. But this is not true in all countries. For example, 
in the Spanish region of Alzira, some PPPs provide clinical services as well as the hospital 
DBFOM activities and, in Madrid, PPP schools provide the in-class curriculum and 
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3teaching as well as the physical buildings.6 In contrast, in more recent PPP contract models, 
such as the U.K.’s PF2, soft services are no longer generally included.7 
Financing arrangements also vary considerably. For example, even in DBFOM-style PPPs, 
such as the Canada Line transit project in Vancouver and the Northeast Anthony Henday 
Drive project in Edmonton, governments provided a significant share of the initial capital. 
For the $889 million Evergreen Line transit project in Vancouver, the contractor designed, 
built and financed the capital costs of the project with repayment of the investment made 
through partial progress payments as key construction milestones were met and with the 
balance paid upon substantial construction completion. In total, the contract period was 
only approximately 3.5 years; after that the project was operated and maintained by the 
public sector. 
In some countries, governments and analysts use the term PPP more broadly. In the U.S., 
for example, any “partnership” (including contractual arrangements) involving the public 
and private sectors may be classified as a PPP. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
treats relatively straightforward contracting-out of government services as falling under 
the PPP umbrella.8 Many commentators in the U.S. regard temporary mixed enterprises 
(like General Motors) or urban renewal projects that are privately controlled, but publicly 
subsidized, as PPPs. 
According to the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, an industry group that 
lobbies in support of PPPs, relatively simple operate-and-maintain contracts or design-build 
contracts are PPPs.9 Infrastructure Ontario classifies PPPs into five categories as shown in 
Table 1. It identifies over 20 hospitals delivered using a build-finance procurement model 
as PPPs. The contractors financed part or all of the construction, where government has 
already developed their preferred design. Contractors are repaid their initial investments 
upon completion.
6 
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4TABLE 1 PPP MODELS IN CANADA, WITH SAMPLE PROJECTS AND CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION DATE
Greater Public 
Sector Responsibility
 Greater Private
 Sector Responsibility
Build Finance Design-Build-Finance Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain
Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain
Long-Term Asset Lease/
Asset Sale
Sudbury Regional Hospital, 
Sudbury (2009)
Humber College Learning 
Resources Centre, Greater 
Toronto (2015)
Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health, Toronto (2012)
Confederation Bridge, New 
Brunswick-Prince Edward 
Island (1997)
NAV Canada Air Traffic 
Control, Canada (1996)
Roy McMurtry Youth 
Detention Centre, Greater 
Toronto (2009)
Lachine Train Maintenance 
Centre ATM, Montreal (2015)
BC Cancer Agency Centre 
for the North Project, Prince 
George (2012)
Canada Line Rapid Transit 
system (2009)
Highway 407, Greater Toronto 
(1999)
Sunnybrook Health Centre, 
Toronto (2010)
Evergreen Rapid Transit Line, 
Metro Vancouver (2016)
Durham Consolidated 
Courthouse, Oshawa (2009)
Chief Peguis Trail Extension, 
Winnipeg (2012)
Bruce nuclear power plant, 
Ontario, (2000)
Markham Pan Am Games 
Centre, Markham (2014)
Mosaic Stadium, Regina 
(2017)
McGill University Health 
Centre, Montreal (2015)
Northeast Anthony Henday 
Drive, Edmonton (2016)
Teranet land-use registry, 
Ontario (2003)
To clarify, for our purposes, we refer to a DBFOM or DBFM contract as a “classic” PPP. 
Such contracts contain financing and a bundle of activities, some of which span the life 
of the contract. However, the private sector does not have to perform 100 per cent of 
the DBFOM activities for a contract to qualify as a PPP. Nonetheless, in most countries 
and here, a PPP requires that the private sector both provides some “significant” project 
financing and also engages in at least two of the other activities. Thus, a contract where the 
private sector provides design, construction and some project finance qualifies as a PPP 
according to our definition. Provision of significant private sector capital, at least during 
the construction phase of the project, is a necessary condition to count as a PPP. This 
requirement ensures that the private sector has some “skin in the game.” But, accordingly, a 
fixed-price design-build contract is not a PPP according to our definition.
Privatization, Asset Sales and the Sale of Long-term Leases. Privatization occurs when 
the public sector transfers ownership and control of an asset to the private sector. Some 
governments have transferred specific highway operations and maintenance to the private 
sector through so-called asset-monetization concessions. In effect, government sells the 
long-term operating rights and maintenance obligations to existing assets in exchange 
for an upfront payment. The private sector receives revenue from the highway tolls it 
collects.10 Examples include the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road. The amounts 
paid by the concessionaire can be high. For example, the winning bidder for the Indiana 
toll-road concession paid US$3.8 billion (in this case, resulting in the initial operator’s 
bankruptcy). In the U.S., asset sales are considered to be PPPs. However, they differ from 
classic DBFOM PPPs because the infrastructure (for example, a highway) is already in 
existence and so there is little, if any, design element or new construction (build): they 
are “brownfield projects” rather than “greenfield projects.” Both Boardman and Vining 
and Snyder and Luby argue that the sale or long-term leasing of existing infrastructure is 
essentially “financial engineering.”11 In our view, such sales are more usefully thought of 
and classified as privatization rather than as a form of PPP.
10 
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11 
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circumstances, the most likely alternative is a number of separate contracts with 
independent private sector companies to design, build, operate and maintain some new 
infrastructure, with the public sector providing non-contracted services. We characterize 
this type of contract as the public sector alternative (PSA).12 Like PPPs, PSAs vary 
considerably in design and scope, but for our purposes, the critical distinguishing features 
are that the private sector does not provide finance, nor does it bundle many different 
activities into a single contract. 
PPP proponents tend to caricature PSAs as situations where construction companies take on 
illusory risk but, in fact, are handed blank cheques, take on no risk and generate huge cost 
overruns.13 However, cost overruns in PSAs are not inevitable. Indeed, a fixed-price design-
build contract may be part of a PSA. Risk transfer is often regarded as a major benefit of 
PPPs, as we discuss later, but this benefit can also be achieved by PSAs. Significant risk 
may be transferred to the private sector in any fixed-price contract, whether that contract is 
organized as a PPP or a PSA. 
Worldwide Use of PPPs
PPPs have been adopted in many developed and developing countries, including Australia, 
India, Ireland, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey, to name just a few. The 
main use of PPPs in the U.S. has been for roads/highways, especially at the state level 
and for water treatment/ desalination plants, especially at the municipal level. In addition, 
the private sector builds and operates new prison facilities. As of late 2012, 32 states 
had enacted PPP-enabling legislation.14 However, relatively few U.S. states have actually 
adopted PPPs in any significant way; the most active are California, Virginia, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Texas and Washington. In some U.S. PPPs, the private sector contributed 
only a relatively small percentage of the capital, with the remainder coming from federal 
or state loans and grants. For example, in the I-495 Capital Beltway HOT Lane project, the 
private equity partner only provided financing for US$349 million of the US$1.93 billion 
total.15 As we discuss above, many so-called transportation PPPs are road concessions, 
which are more appropriately thought of as privatization rather than as PPPs. 
PPPs have also been used in a number of key emerging countries including India, Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, mostly to deliver new toll highways. In Colombia, for 
example, the Bogota bus-rapid-transit system was delivered through a PPP. In Africa, South 
Africa has been the main country where PPPs have been used to deliver infrastructure, 
including hospitals, government buildings, toll roads, and the Gautrain mass-rapid-transit 
line (connecting Johannesburg and Pretoria). China has made extensive use of PPPs in 
12 
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6the road, transit and water sectors, but in many cases there is a blurring of the public 
and private sectors, making some of these arrangements more akin to public-public 
partnerships. 
An Overview of PPPs in Canada
In Canada, well-known early PPPs included Highway 407 (1999), the Confederation Bridge 
(1997) and the Pearson Airport in Toronto (1996).16 Boardman and Vining have written a 
detailed account of the period 2000–2010 in Canada.17 PPPs have been used mainly at the 
provincial level, with relatively few at the municipal or federal levels. From 2000–2010, 
British Columbia (B.C.), Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec were the most active provinces. 
Most Ontario projects in the past few years have been large transportation projects, such 
as the Herb Grey Parkway in Windsor, and LRT projects in Toronto, Ottawa and Waterloo, 
following a wave of hospital and justice-system projects. As discussed above, Ontario uses 
an expansive definition of PPP, ranging from build-finance projects that are primarily used 
for large renovations or expansions of existing assets (e.g., Sunnybrook Health Sciences 
Centre and Roy McMurtry Youth Detention Centre) to classic DBFOMs (See Table 1). 
Recent PPPs in Canada focus more on transferring facility “construction risk” (i.e., 
delivering the project on time and on budget) rather than demand or revenue risk. Indeed, 
most recent PPPs in Ontario do not include new user fees, even in sectors such as roads 
where tolls have been used globally. In contrast, there are tolls on new PPP bridges in B.C., 
such as the Golden Ears Bridge, as well as on other new bridges that were not PPPs, such as 
the Port Mann Bridge.
Governance of PPPs in Canada
In Canada, the B.C. and Ontario governments and the federal government have established 
special-purpose PPP agencies. Partnerships BC, Infrastructure Ontario and PPP Canada 
are Crown corporations, in effect if not in name, 100 per cent owned by the respective 
governments. These agencies are mandated to promote PPPs. For example, PPP Canada 
provides “expertise and advice in assessing and executing PPP opportunities at the 
federal level as well as leveraging greater value for money from Government of Canada 
investments in provincial, territorial, municipal and First Nations infrastructure through the 
PPP Canada Fund.”18 Thus, it is an important source of funds for municipalities that want to 
use PPPs. At this point in time, it is not yet clear whether the incoming federal government 
will continue this policy.
These agencies have their own boards of directors and are staffed by professional 
specialists. The provincial agencies are responsible for developing the methodologies used 
16 
A Vining, A. Boardman and F. Poschmann, “Public-Private Partnerships in the U.S. and Canada: There Are No ‘Free 
Lunches,’” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 7, 3 (2005): 199-220.
17 
A. Boardman and A Vining, “P3s in North America: Renting the Money (in Canada), Selling the Roads (in the USA),” in 
International Handbook on Public-Private Partnerships, ed. G. Hodge, C. Greve, and A. Boardman (Cheltenham, U.K.: 
Edward Elgar, 2010), 354-398.
18 
PPP Canada website, “About us,” accessed February 9, 2016, http://www.p3canada.ca/about-us/.
7to assess the value for money of a PPP. These assessment methods vary considerably.19 
These agencies also commission the studies on individual projects, which are typically 
carried out by major accounting firms. The PPP agency is responsible for running the 
procurement process—soliciting bids, selecting winners and negotiating final terms 
with bidders, conducting value-for-money studies, writing contracts and monitoring the 
construction phase of the project. In most cases, once construction is completed, the asset 
becomes available for use by the line ministry (e.g., health, transportation, justice, etc.) or 
agency (e.g., a health authority or municipal transit agency) that is the primary operator 
of the facility. This agency then monitors and enforces the contract during the operation 
phase of the concession. From that point on, PPP agencies typically have little or no direct 
involvement in projects. 
3. THEORETICAL BENEFITS: NORMATIVE RATIONALES FOR PPPS
Introduction
This section discusses the normative justifications for PPPs; that is, why it might be 
appropriate to use PPPs to provide infrastructure. Boardman and Vining argue that the 
key relevant normative criteria for most government decision-making should be allocative 
efficiency or, more broadly, social welfare.20 Either version of this goal can be expressed 
as a linear combination of (the present value of) consumer benefits (consumer surplus), 
private sector benefits (producer surplus), employee benefits (employee surplus) and 
net government revenues (government surplus). The benefits or costs that each group 
bears should be adjusted for risk. The PPP should then be compared to other alternative 
procurement method(s), the PSA.
Incentive Incompatibility and Cost-Saving Innovations
Traditional government-procured or -produced infrastructure projects have often cost 
considerably more than initially budgeted and have failed to meet their construction 
timelines or their demand and performance targets.21 Many analysts have pointed out the 
major problem facing such cost-plus (non-fixed-price) public sector procurement is the poor 
incentive structure of the relationship.22 Often there is a moral hazard problem: the more it 
costs, the more the private sector is paid.23 In response, Flyvbjerg et al. argue that although 
19 
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20 
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21 
B. Flyvbjerg, “What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: An Overview,” Project Management Journal 45 
(2014): 6-19.
22 
R. McAfee, R. Preston and J. McMillan, “Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis,” RAND Journal of Economics 
17, 3 (1989): 326-338.
23 
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8governments can avoid some incentive incompatibility problems by signing fixed-price 
contracts, these contracts are difficult or time-consuming to enforce.24
Against this backdrop, PPPs that include some private finance have the potential to create 
better incentives for private sector firms to overcome the moral-hazard problem and to 
better control risks that they are able to manage. Thus, if done appropriately, the private 
sector firms are incentivized to deliver projects more cost-efficiently. In turn, greater cost-
efficiency will likely improve social welfare.
In recent years, innovation has also emerged as an important public policy goal that 
governments seek to deliver. It is often claimed that PPPs provide more innovation than do 
PSAs. However, it is important to note that an innovation is not just an invention. In our 
view it must increase social welfare. The incentives within PPPs may encourage inventions 
that drive down project costs and reduce risks to the concessionaire over the life of the 
contract, and improve social welfare. However, treating the cost-saving innovations and the 
cost savings themselves as separate benefits would be double counting them.
Economies of Scope Benefits 
A key rationale for using PPPs is the potential for economies of scope among some or all 
of the bundled activities.25 Typically, the SPV brings together firms with complementary 
expertise early in the bidding stage and incentivizes them to jointly develop a proposal 
that reduces total lifecycle costs. In principle, co-ordination leads to facility designs that 
are actually buildable without requiring extensive changes and have an appropriate long-
term maintenance and rehabilitation strategy in place. Such economies of scope may lead 
to social welfare benefits. Furthermore, these benefits may increase as more activities 
are bundled together and, therefore, are potentially largest in a DBFOM contract. A more 
limited DBF contract is unlikely to realize such benefits.
Quality and Innovation Benefits
Bundling complementary skills in a PPP and the nature of the PPP contract-negotiation 
process may produce a higher-quality project; that is, one that is better from the perspective 
of the operator or the user (consumer).26 Such benefits improve social welfare. However, 
while quality improvements are possible in a PPP, the incentive structure encourages cost-
reducing innovations, not quality-improving innovations. 
Some critics argue that governments are more willing to invest in building new facilities 
than in their maintenance.27 Under-investment in the maintenance of government facilities 
24 
B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius and W. Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).
25 
O. Hart, “Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships,” The 
Economic Journal 113, 486 (2003): 69-76.
26 If the PPP also has lower costs, we can simply say it offers better value.
27 Under-maintenance may arise because governments may prefer to spend money on new infrastructure, rather than on 
maintaining existing infrastructure, for political reasons or the desire to “make a mark.” Or, a new government may not be 
committed to the project of a previous government.
9will lead to the social value of that asset declining more than optimally. A key aspect of 
PPPs is that maintenance is explicitly included in the contract and “ring-fenced.” Better 
and more appropriate maintenance expenditures may result in an asset that provides more 
benefit to the operator or users.
Risk-Transfer Benefits?
PPP proponents argue that a major benefit of PPPs is transfer of risks to the private sector. 
Risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage the risk. Basically, this means 
the party that can bear the risk at the lowest cost. However, assuming no difference in costs, 
moving the risk from the public sector to the private sector is not a benefit, but is simply a 
transfer from a social welfare perspective.28 What matters is whether a PPP can mitigate or 
manage these risks better than a PSA can. If it can (and assuming other costs and benefits 
are the same), then the total lifetime cost of the PPP will be lower than that of the PSA. 
Thus, risk transfer will be taken into account in a correctly conducted financial analysis. 
Risk transfer should not be treated as an additional benefit. 
Of course, there are political benefits to transferring risk. Indeed, this is a major reason 
governments favour PPPs. But one does not get something for nothing. The private sector 
requires compensation to take on additional risk. This payment for risk is equivalent to an 
insurance premium: the government purchases an insurance policy against the risk of cost 
overruns and other risks.29 Why doesn’t the government self-insure? According to finance 
theory, if the goal is to maximize government wealth (i.e., minimize the present value of 
government costs) and government holds a diversified portfolio of investments (i.e., projects 
and programs), then government should ignore non-systematic (i.e., project-specific) risk.30 
Therefore, there is no financial reason why government should pay for insurance. But 
because a PPP implies that government is not self-insuring, we can infer that governments 
generally shift the risks to the private sector for political reasons. This argument applies to 
government jurisdictions with well-diversified portfolios. Regional districts or municipal 
governments do not necessarily manage large, diversified portfolios of projects or 
programs. In this situation, risk transfer may have some value.
In practice, the risks that governments seek to transfer vary considerably. The two most 
important risks are construction-cost risk and revenue risk.31 The former is nearly always 
transferred in a PPP (as well as in fixed-price PSAs). Revenue-risk transfer varies across 
countries and over time. Many private sector participants in PPPs are very reluctant to 
take on both construction-cost risk and revenue risk. PPPs that take on revenue risk are 
exposed to many factors that may lower their revenues including increases in competition. 
Sometimes government may compete directly with a PPP by, for example, building new 
non-toll road that follows a similar route to a PPP toll road. Where they bear revenue risks, 
28 In fact, this transfer involves transaction costs.
29 
P. Edwards et al., Evaluating the Operation of PFI in Roads and Hospitals (London: Certified Accountants Educational 
Trust, 2004); F. Blanc-Brude, H. Goldsmith and T. Välilä, “A Comparison of Construction Contract Prices for Traditionally 
Procured Roads and Public-Private Partnerships,” Review of Industrial Organization 35, 1-2 (2009): 9-40. 
30 
J. Berk and P. DeMarzo, Corporate Finance, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2013).
31 In practice, governments rarely transfer all of the risks. Government almost always remains as the residual financier and 
risk holder. With respect to construction risk, government often retains permitting risk, which is more within its control.
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private sector firms are likely to demand comprehensive non-compete terms that restrict 
governments from taking measures that undermine revenues. 
Fiscal Constraints and Additions to Infrastructure
In a classic PPP, government is responsible for only a relatively small part of the costs 
upfront, and often little or nothing throughout the construction phase. Only after 
construction has finished and the PPP is operational, do governments or users begin 
to pay substantial amounts and, even then, payments are generally spread over many 
years—usually 25–30 years. In many countries the future liability does not appear on the 
government’s balance sheet and is, therefore, an example of off-balance-sheet financing. 
This strategy appears to improve government’s current budgetary position and minimizes 
or reduces the government’s short-run deficit (i.e., current incremental borrowing). By 
using off-balance-sheet financing of PPPs, governments can get around internal or external 
borrowing limitations.32 
Government administrators often say that projects were only undertaken because they were 
PPPs. A financially strapped government that is unwilling to raise taxes may not be able to 
undertake a PSA. But it might be possible to undertake the project as a PPP by using off-
balance-sheet financing. Thus, PPPs may be associated with more infrastructure than would 
otherwise occur, at least in the short run. They are a way to provide infrastructure when 
facing binding fiscal constraints.
Getting around borrowing limitations can have normative merit. Most governments do not 
make a clear distinction between current expenditures and capital investments. Long-term 
investments are fundamentally different from current expenditures because, by definition, 
they extend over time. Thus, many of the benefits arise in the future (and potentially benefit 
future generations). Mintz and Smart show that a relaxation of borrowing rules could 
improve economic performance.33 They argue that capital should be separated from current 
revenues and expenditures and they consider relaxing fiscal constraints so that capital 
expenditures are funded by debt. If governments do not relax the fiscal constraints for 
capital projects, one can make a case that PPPs are a “second-best” solution.
4. WHY GOVERNMENTS LIKE PPPS
Positive Rationales for PPPs
Using PPPs to procure infrastructure has specific features that make them highly 
attractive to governments. As Hodge and Greve argue, PPPs must be understood as both 
a legitimate project-delivery approach that has the potential to deliver public value when 
32 
Sometimes these limits are imposed by previous governments in the same country, as in the case of the U.K.’s PSBR, or 
they may be imposed by the European Union, for example, to meet the Maastricht criteria related to public debt. 
33 
J. M. Mintz and M. Smart, “Incentives for Public Investment under Fiscal Rules,” World Bank Policy Research Group 
Working Paper 3860 (2006).
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used appropriately, and also a governance tool that has the potential to deliver significant 
political benefits to the political party or ruling interests in power.34 In this light it is 
necessary to explore why governments may seek to leverage PPPs to realize their own 
political objectives. Drawing on political economy theory, we refer to these reasons as 
“positive” rationales for government selection of PPPs.35 
Oversimplifying somewhat, governments seek to maximize votes or political benefits. 
While there should be a financial imperative for governments to better manage 
infrastructure delivery to protect the public interest, there are strong political reasons for 
governments to prefer PPPs over PSAs.36 This section discusses the major ways in which 
PPPs help incumbent governments. 
On Time and On Budget
Claiming “on-time and on-budget” project delivery is one way that PPPs deliver political 
benefits. Cost overruns on mega-projects are a highly visible symbol of government 
mismanagement and failure, which reflect poorly on the political party in power. Such 
projects often receive extensive media coverage, and it is common for late or over-budget 
projects to become key issues in election campaigns. As we discuss above, traditional 
government procurement has led to cost overruns in the past. Since PPPs reduce the 
probability of cost overruns and increase the probability of being on time and on budget, 
they also generate political benefits.
PPPs are potentially more likely to be on time and on budget for three reasons. First, the 
construction phase does not begin until the end of an extensive planning and negotiation 
period so that the PPP is “ready to go” immediately upon contract signing. Second, due 
to the nature of the contract (the ability to write clear conditions into it), PPPs have strong 
incentives to complete on time and on budget. Third, a PPP contract is relatively inflexible, 
which reduces the likelihood of making expensive changes.37 How relevant are the “on-time 
and on-budget” criteria for judging the value of PPPs? They have much political appeal. 
However, longer contract negotiations can mean that the total time frame is actually longer 
than it would otherwise be—in effect, “the clock” starts ticking later. Furthermore, there 
may be higher financing costs and transaction costs. However, “on-time and on-budget” 
criteria eliminate one form of optimism bias: government’s ability to fool itself with respect 
to schedules and costs. 
34 
G. Hodge and C. Greve, “Public-Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or Language Game?” Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 69 (2010): S8-S22.
35 
Boardman and Vining, “The Political Economy.”
36 
A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).
37 Of course, all contracts contain termination agreements and force majeure clauses. Force majeure provisions vary 
considerably across jurisdictions, but there are almost always some limitations on private sector risk exposure. See:  
Allen and Overy, Termination and Force Majeure Provisions in PPP Contracts (Luxembourg: European PPP Expertise 
Centre, 2012).
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Rent to Own: Provide Now, Pay Later
Governments are tempted to use PPPs to provide infrastructure now, even if they do 
not face binding fiscal constraints, because voters tend to suffer from “fiscal illusion.” 
Governments may garner votes by obscuring the level of spending and the tax requirements 
associated with that spending.38 Governments prefer opaque methods of raising revenue 
or expenditures to direct taxation. Politicians or elected officials may act as though they 
believe that voters do not exhibit rational expectations with respect to expenditures.39
As mentioned above, a difference between a PPP and direct government provision is 
the timing of the cash flows. With direct government provision, government bears large 
“upfront” costs and relatively low costs “over time” (typically for 30 years). In a typical 
PPP, government pays little or nothing “upfront” and relatively large amounts “over 
time.” Thus, incumbent governments can provide current users and voters with current 
benefits, thereby garnering political credit, while deferring costs to future politicians, 
future voters or users. Importantly, however, the government’s cash costs are shifted, they 
are not eliminated and might increase over the life of the project. Boardman and Vining 
characterize this government strategy as “renting the money,” although it could also be 
described as “rent to own.”40 
Higher Net Government Revenues from Toll Projects
Another potentially attractive PPP feature from the government’s perspective is that the 
project may feature tolls and, if so, the tolls may be higher than if government provided 
the infrastructure directly. Non-users perceive tolls as more fair because they pay less 
while users pay more. Users do not like paying tolls to anyone. However, they appear to be 
somewhat less resistant to paying tolls to the private sector than to government, although 
evidence is hard to find. Greater distance from toll payers that the PPP format provides 
may reduce government’s political risk associated with tolling and increase governments’ 
willingness to allow the imposition of some user fees or higher user fees than would 
otherwise prevail. Potential user resistance is hard to organize before the project is finalized 
due to the collective action problem. 
Keeping The Consultocracy Happy
PPPs also often provide political benefits by channelling financial benefits to aligned 
interest groups, such as law firms, merchant banks, large construction firms and 
consultants, labelled by Hodge and Bowman as the “consultocracy.”41 For example, 
38 
T. Borcherding, S. Ferris and A. Garzini, “The Growth of Real Government,” in Handbook of Public Choice, ed. J. 
Backhaus and R. Wagner (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 77-108.
39 
R. Sauer, “The Political Economy of Gambling Regulation,” Managerial and Decision Economics 22 (2001): 5-15; M. 
Marlow and D. Joulfain, “The Determinants of Off-Budget Activity of State and Local Governments,” Public Choice 63, 2 
(1989): 113-123.
40 
See Boardman and Vining, “P3s in North America.”
41 
G. Hodge and D. Bowman, “The ‘Consultocracy’: The Business of Reforming Government,” in Privatization and Market 
Development: Global Movements in Public Policy Ideas, ed. Graeme Hodge (2006), Chapter 6.
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Hellowell has made the case that, when initially elected, “New Labour” in the U.K. 
continued with Conservative Party’s PPP policy in order to curry favour with “the City.”42 
5. DISADVANTAGES OF PPPS
Higher PPP Financing Costs
Even if a PPP could provide a project at a lower production cost (i.e., excluding financing 
costs) compared to the PSA, its total cost to government costs might still be higher when 
other costs are included. A key reason is the difference is the cost of capital. A PPP is 
financed by private capital, which is paid back over the length of the contract (typically on 
the order of 25–30 years). The mix of debt and equity financing does vary widely: PPPs 
are often highly leveraged, using 90 per cent private debt and only 10 per cent equity. The 
higher cost of capital in a PPP stems largely from a higher cost of debt. Interest rates for 
PPPs are normally around 150–300 basis points above (national or provincial) government 
rates, but rose to 300–400 basis points higher in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial 
crisis.43 This difference adds significantly to the cost of PPP project delivery, especially 
when the private financing is repaid over the long-term life of the operating concession. 
Even in Ontario, which has made extensive use of short-term PPP construction finance, the 
auditor general concluded this financing cost was $6.5 billion (or 14 times) more costly than 
government borrowing. This analysis was based on a portfolio of 75 infrastructure projects 
that had base construction and operation costs of $26 billion.44 
But, some analysts argue that, in fact, there is little difference between the financing costs 
of a PPP and PSA. De Bettignes and Ross argue that government funds come mainly from 
borrowing in financial markets where they compete with the private sector. Governments 
can only raise capital at a lower rate than the private sector because of a lower default risk. 
When this default risk is taken into account, the effective borrowing rates of government 
and the private sector are quite similar.45 Similarly, Boyer, Gravel and Mokbel argue that 
government’s risk-free borrowing rate may not reflect the risk actually borne by taxpayers 
who implicitly guarantee to provide additional funds should they be necessary.46 These 
arguments imply the risk-free rate that governments can borrow at underestimates the true 
cost of capital. Should default risk be taken into account? The counter-argument is that the 
government can, in fact, finance at a lower rate and, therefore, this is the rate that should be 
used for a financial evaluation.
42 
M. Hellowell, “The UK’s Private Finance Initiative: History, Evaluation, Prospects,” in International Handbook on Public-
Private Partnerships, ed. G. Hodge, C. Greve and A. Boardman (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2010), 307-332.
43 
D. Ford, Capital Markets 2013 Mid-Year Report: The Role of Capital Markets in P3 Financing (Torys LLP), accessed 
January 23, 2014, http://www.torys.com/Publications/Pages/CapitalMarkets2013Mid-YearReport-05.aspx. 
44 
Auditor General of Ontario, “Infrastructure Ontario—Alternative Financing and Procurement” (2014), accessed May 22, 
2015, http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en14/305en14.pdf.
45 
J. De Bettignes and T. Ross, “The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships,” Canadian Public Policy 30, 2 (2004): 135-154.
46 
M. Boyer, E. Gravel and S. Mokbel, “The Valuation of Public Projects: Risks, Cost of Financing and Cost of Capital,” 
Commentary 388 (C.D. Howe Institute, 2013).
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Higher Private Sector Transaction Costs and Risks
PPP consortium formation takes time and experience. Also, developing and negotiating a 
PPP bid requires more upfront design and engineering work than in traditional procurement, 
and these costs are often only recouped if the bid is successful. Managing the bid and the 
contract requires good contracting and co-ordination skills, which are expensive to develop 
and provide. All of these factors raise firms’ transaction costs.
Additionally, firms require a premium to compensate for the ex post risks that government 
actions will change the contract conditions. Some contracts explicitly restrain some future 
government behaviour. However, private sector firms require a significant premium if 
current and successor governments have considerable leeway to alter contracts to the firms’ 
detriment. These premiums are likely to be particularly high if the PPP assumes revenue risk.
High Private Sector Profit Margins
Even if a PPP had lower costs than a PSA, the private sector participants per se do not want 
to pass on the lower costs to government. Their primary goal is to maximize their profits. 
Sometimes this reality gets lost in the “partnership” rhetoric and in governments’ desire 
to deliver services. Private sector profit margins are a cost to government. Of course this 
cost applies to PSA contracts as well. The key issue is whether PPP margins are likely to be 
higher. 
The major determinant of any difference in profit margins depends on the level of 
competitiveness during the bidding and contract-negotiation stages. Private sector firms 
or consortia are more likely to be able to negotiate a high price (and therefore enjoy high 
margins) if there are few bidders. In practice, the bidding process in many PPPs may not 
be very competitive due to significant barriers to entry. These barriers may arise because 
of the nature of projects, their size and complexity, actions of governments themselves 
(for example, restricting bids to domestic firms), and informational barriers (for example, 
knowing how to contract with government). 
Higher Government Transaction Costs
Transaction costs include all of the costs that are required to initiate, negotiate and manage 
the PPP relationship over the life of the contract. These costs include deal structuring and 
closing costs, staff time for performance monitoring and meetings with service providers, 
data-collection regimes and external audits, and for dispute resolutions or contract 
renegotiation. 
Williamson argues that the level of transaction costs depends on: the degree of asset 
specificity, the level of complexity, and uncertainty.47 PPP contracts often have these 
characteristics and therefore are likely to have high transaction costs. PPP contract costs 
are also likely to be affected by the level of ex ante competition and government contract-
47 
O.E. Williamson, “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,” The American Journal of Sociology 
87, 3 (1981): 548–577.
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management skills. Most PPPs exhibit high asset specificity, complexity, uncertainty/
inflexibility, low ex ante competition and (sometimes) poor contract management skills.48 
Therefore, PPP projects are likely to have high transaction costs.49 Proponents of PPPs tend 
to focus on the “partnership” between the public and private sectors. However, Boardman 
and Vining emphasize that government is the “principal” in these contracts, while the SPV 
or the private sector firms are the “agents” and there are inevitable principal-agent problems 
that increase transaction costs.50
PPP contracting can be thought of as government contracting out under unfavourable 
circumstances. Flyvbjerg et al. point out that fixed-price PSA contracts can be difficult or 
time-consuming to enforce.51 However, PPP contracts are generally much more complicated 
and cover a much longer time frame. Therefore, PPP transaction costs are likely to be 
significantly higher than PSA transaction costs. Of course, the irony is that complex and 
uncertain projects are exactly the ones where governments would like to reduce their risk 
exposure for normative and positive reasons.
Profit maximization is a dynamic process. Firms wish to maximize the present value of 
their future risk-adjusted cash flows at all times during the contract. Over time, as events 
unfold, firms’ optimal strategies will often change and firms may extract more profits 
through renegotiation of incomplete contracts. Problems may also arise because some 
members of a consortium may sell their equity interest in a PPP and maintenance providers 
often turn over. Later participants may be more “aggressive” in their demands.  
Private sector opportunism is potentially high because PPP contracts are intentionally 
inflexible. Inflexibility has both benefits and costs. Governments cannot change their minds 
on the fly. However, ex ante, there is uncertainty and, as events unfold and demands placed 
on public facilities evolve, governments may legitimately wish to change the terms of the 
contract. Contracts might be renegotiated at an acceptable price but often government is 
subject to “hold-up” by the private sector and incurs significant costs.52
Another reason why governments’ transactions cost may be particularly high in PPP 
contracts is that governments might get into an “escalation of commitment.”53 For a 
government, there is often more at stake in terms of political outcomes (and symbolism) 
48 
Asset specificity depends primarily on the nature of the project itself and is largely invariant to the procurement alternative. 
Obviously, a bridge in a particular location is a highly specific asset. However, PPP “innovation” may lead to lower-cost 
fixed assets, which, in turn, increases the degree of “sunkness.” For example, PSA stations on the Canada Line might 
have had more sunkness than the PPP stations that were built. Also, PPPs might behave strategically and design in more 
flexibility in an asset’s uses if it thinks the government may want to change the use of a facility. It might be able to extract 
higher future payments for making changes. There is little doubt that PPP contracts are more complex than PSA contracts. 
They involve simultaneous consideration of multiple stages/activities that extend over a long period of time. More 
contingencies must be considered. The longer time period also means that there is greater uncertainty. PSA contracts focus 
on fewer activities and occur over a considerably shorter time frame. 
49 
Vining, Boardman and Poschmann, “Public-Private Partnerships.”
50 
Boardman and Vining, “The Political Economy.”
51 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter Megaprojects and Risk.
52 
T. Ross and J. Yang, “Comparing Public-Private Partnerships and Traditional Public Procurement: Efficiency vs. 
Flexibility,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis (online April 23, 2015).
53 
J. Ross and B. Staw, “Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant,” Academy of 
Management Journal 36, 4 (1993): 701-732.
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than there is in the project outcome itself.54 Politicians may be vulnerable to escalation 
of commitment for two reasons. First, those initiating the PPP agenda may make an 
ideological commitment to the PPP process. Second, although many of the economic 
costs on a particular project may be sunk at some given point, the political costs are not 
sunk. Politicians in executive positions (as well as government PPP-contracting agencies) 
want to avoid the perception that they have made a bad investment decision or that they 
are vacillating or weak. Consequently, even if a PPP develops major problems, political 
proponents are unable to credibly threaten to “pull the plug” on a project. Knowing this, 
private sector participants may “up the ante,” especially if they sense desperation on the 
government’s part. This problem can be most severe when a PPP is still in the construction 
phase or where a project has already started and the contract has not been finalized. 
Government is Always the Residual Risk Holder
PPPs always carry the risk that a private sector participant could go bankrupt. Some level 
of bankruptcy is optimal from a societal risk-allocation perspective, although bankruptcies 
impose high transaction costs on all actors. PPPs are government projects. In the event 
of one firm in the consortium or the SPV entering into bankruptcy, governments still 
retain the residual risk and associated costs of the project: whether they re-contract the 
project, complete the project themselves or (most unlikely) decommission it. In the event 
that bankruptcy cannot be resolved by an entirely private sector solution and government 
intervenes, private sector investors usually receive a significantly reduced “haircut” than 
they otherwise would. However, because equity investors are only exposed to the loss of 
their equity investment, they have, in effect, a put option. PPP contracts may underestimate 
the expected cost of this equity investor option. 
6. HOW HAVE PPPS ACTUALLY PERFORMED: IN CANADA AND GLOBALLY?
Introduction
Almost all of the participants in PPPs sing their praises. But data about the actual 
performance of PPPs are scarce and, even if they do exist, it is hard for disinterested 
analysts to access them. Assessing success is made difficult by the reality that PPP 
participants (including government-specialist PPP units) control and limit access to most 
of the relevant data. In contrast, the media tend to focus on negative experiences. Various 
auditors general provide the most balanced assessments, but given their mandates, they 
naturally focus on auditing rather than on comprehensive evaluation. 
Do PPPs deliver the normative benefits or exhibit some of the disadvantages we have 
described above? The key question is whether PPPs increase social value relative to a 
PSA or some other relevant counter-factual. To date, much of the published evidence on 
54 
M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1985); A. Brown, “Politics, 
Symbolic Action and Myth Making in Pursuit of Legitimacy,” Organization Studies 15, 6 (1994): 861-878.
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PPPs by somewhat disinterested scholars draws upon case studies of individual projects 
or a small group of non-randomly selected projects and therefore cannot provide a 
completely satisfactory answer to the key question. However, there is now a burgeoning 
multidisciplinary body of literature focusing on PPPs around the world. Here we draw on 
this literature to provide an impression of the actual performance outcomes of PPPs to date. 
The available, limited evidence suggests mixed success. PPPs are not always “problem, 
problem, problem” nor are they the nirvana that many proponents would have one believe.
This section first examines the competitive nature of the bidding process and then discusses 
the on-time and on-budget criteria. It then considers the evidence about PPP cost savings, 
whether due to better incentive compatibility or economies of scope. It then turns to the 
benefits side and considers benefits (and costs) accruing to users or consumers. Next, it 
considers the impacts on employees and the private sector. Finally it considers various 
impacts on government: risk transfer, government transaction costs, whether PPPs produce 
net additions to infrastructure, whether PPPs create future affordability problems and 
whether PPPs provide value for money.
The Bidding Process
Those managing the PPP process seek expressions of interest from as many qualified 
bidders as possible. PPP agencies then typically invite complete bids from three different 
consortiums. This balances the necessity for sufficient competition on one hand with the 
recognition that developing a complete PPP bid is very costly and time-consuming. As 
the Canadian PPP market has become more mature and there has been a robust pipeline 
of projects, many large international firms have bid on PPP projects alongside Canadian 
incumbents. Generally, there are a sufficient number of bidders in Canada, although there 
are examples where requests for proposals only mustered a few bidders. For example, the 
Eglinton Crosstown light rail line in Toronto and a PPP to deliver a bundle of multiple 
schools in Alberta only received one or two bidders. Often the number of bidders decreases 
as the PPP bundles more activities.55
On Time and On Budget 
PPP advocates emphasize the on-time and on-budget criteria because PPPs often perform 
well on them. In Canada, PPPs constructed since the mid-2000s have generally been 
completed on time and on budget. In Ontario, Infrastructure Ontario concluded that of 
30 projects delivered since 2007 by the agency, 29 were completed below budget and 22 
were conducted on time.56 Similarly, in British Columbia, a Ministry of Finance review of 
Partnerships BC found that all 40 PPP projects delivered by the agency since 2002 were 
completed on time and within budget.57 
55 
A.S. Solino and J.M. Vassalo, “Using Public-Private Partnerships to Expand Subways: Madrid-Barajas International 
Airport Case Study,” Journal of Management in Engineering 25, 1 (2009): 21-28.
56 MNP, Infrastructure Ontario Alternative Financing and Procurement (AFP) Project Track Record Review. (Toronto: 
Infrastructure Ontario, 2013). 
57 
British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, “Review of Partnerships BC,” accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/ocg/
ias/pdf_docs/Review%20of%20PBC.pdf.
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While a PPP construction may be delivered on time and on budget, these are not the 
appropriate criteria to assess social value. The size of the budget is much more important. 
If the budget is padded enough, it is reasonably easy to come in on time and on budget. 
Indeed, PPP contracts may include large premiums to ensure that budgets are actually met. 
Edwards et al., for example, concluded that in the U.K., the Highways Agency paid a 25 
per cent premium on construction costs on its first four PPP road projects.58 This premium 
was paid to ensure that they were built on time and on budget. Similarly, Blanc-Brude, 
Goldsmith and Välilä, in their examination of European road-project PPPs undertaken 
between 1990 and 2005, conclude that ex ante construction prices were approximately 
24 per cent higher than for traditionally procured roads. They find that this is roughly 
equivalent to reported ex post cost overruns for traditionally procured PSA projects.59
It is important to note that costs often escalate significantly between the first publicly 
announced PPP budget estimate and the eventual fixed-price signed agreement. For 
example, in British Columbia, the Golden Ears Bridge had a total construction cost of $808 
million, well over the initial budget of $600 million. The cost of the Canada Line rapid-
transit project rose from $1.35 billion when it was first brought forward for approval to 
$2.1 billion when the final contract was signed. The cost of the William Bennett Bridge in 
Kelowna rose from $100 million when initially announced to $144 million when the project 
contract was signed. In each of these cases once the final contracts were signed, the projects 
were built to their contracted price. In effect, therefore, there were “moving budgets.”
Suspicions about budget padding and moving budget limits would be less of an issue if 
the government’s PPP advocacy agency were not the agency deciding what the budget 
should be. But it often is. Indeed, when these factors are taken into account it may well be 
that some PPP contracts incur the same sort of cost-underestimation as traditional PSA 
contracts, which we discussed earlier.
Innovations that Provide Cost Reductions and Economies of Scope
Private sector participants that bring process or product innovations that lower costs have 
done so through design or construction innovations. These include the selection of the 
optimal building materials and finishes, and through developing smaller building footprints 
within the performance specification to save costs, rather than major design changes that 
enhance public utility.60 This kind of benefit, in theory and in practice, is one of the largest 
potential sources of benefits from PPPs. Government administrators have little expertise 
and few incentives to come up with innovative designs or construction approaches that 
reduce total lifecycle costs. However, fixed-price design-build PSAs have similar incentives 
to reduce design and construction costs, though not necessarily total lifecycle costs.
58 
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One of the major purported benefits of PPPs is that there are economies of scope from 
bundling different activities into a single contract. If so, the present value of the total 
lifecycle costs of a PPP might be lower than for a PSA. Unfortunately, the evidence on this 
important issue simply does not exist as far as we are aware.
Quality and Innovation Benefits: Impacts on Users and Consumers
PPPs can have positive and negative impacts on users and surrounding communities. 
The Canada Line rapid-transit project in Vancouver illustrates both. The winning PPP 
consortium proposed building a significant portion of the underground rapid-transit 
line using a cut-and-cover method rather than a deep-bore tunnelling approach that 
was expected by project planners and members of the community. The cut-and-cover 
construction method had lower cost and was less risky for the contractor. It also enabled 
stations to be built nearer the surface, which made them easier to access by transit users 
and created user benefits. However, the cut-and-cover construction method was far more 
disruptive to traffic during the building period and had a significant, adverse impact on 
retailers in the surrounding area, resulting in a long-running lawsuit to recoup lost store 
incomes.
As we discuss above, PPPs might put forward a more optimal maintenance program. 
However, even if the original budget allocates funds for maintenance, this is no guarantee 
that maintenance will be performed optimally or that the facility is, at the end of the 
contract term, transferred to the public sector in accordance with the value or in the 
condition specified in the contract. The latter risk is referred to as residual risk value.61 
Partially because few PPP contracts have reached the end of the contract period in Canada 
and the difficulty of finding an appropriate counter-factual, there is no empirical evidence 
about this.
Some PPP proponents claim that PPPs have a more innovative “look and feel.” However, 
iconic architecture and design has not been a common feature of PPPs in Canada or 
globally. The evidence on the architecture of PPPs suggests that PPPs tend to deliver 
functional, if mediocre architecture, with very few PPP projects globally winning major 
awards for architectural merit.
Impacts on Employees
In general, private sector unions are supportive of PPPs while public sector unions are not. 
Private sector unions, such as the carpenters’ union in Ontario and the American building 
and trades unions, have been largely supportive. These construction unions think that PPPs 
will create more employment.62 In contrast, public sector unions, which provide operations 
and maintenance of infrastructure projects, have opposed PPPs. In Canada, union websites 
often criticize the use of PPPs; see for example, the sites of the Canadian Union of Public 
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Employees and National Union of Public and General Employees. There is some anecdotal 
evidence that PPPs reduce the bargaining power of some unions and reduce employee 
wages. With the Kelowna General Hospital in British Columbia, for example, by building a 
new acute-care facility tower as a PPP, the private sector consortium took over the cleaning 
contract for the entire facility and reduced both the number of employees and employee 
wages. 
Private Sector Profit Margins
A number of private sector firms have specialized in PPP projects. Presumably, these 
firms earn at least a normal return from this business. However, given the high barriers 
to entry, the returns are likely to be higher. Empirical evidence concerning private sector 
returns from individual PPPs is slim, as firms do not publish financial data on individual 
projects. However, Vecchi, Hellowell and Gattic find that private sector participants in 
PPPs that provide hospital facilities in the U.K. earn an excess return of almost 10 per cent 
on average.63 And in Lesotho, the annual government payments to the concessionaire that 
operates a new hospital in the capital increase by seven per cent each year to account for 
inflation, and generate a 25 per cent return on investment for the private partner.64 
Some SPVs have gone bankrupt. However, in many of these cases, the existence of an 
SPV limits the liabilities of the parent private-sector firms. To begin, private sector equity 
investment is often limited and governments may guarantee the debt held by bondholders if 
debt payments by the SPV are in doubt. 
Government Risk Transfer
PPP projects are often “sold” to the public on the basis of significant risk transfer to the 
private sector partners, including revenue risk transfer. Risk transfer might pertain to both 
costs and revenues. PPPs do transfer cost risks to the private sector. However, most of these 
risks could be transferred to the private sector in other fixed-price contracts. Also, the 
premiums paid may exceed the benefit to government. To date there is limited empirical 
evidence upon which to assess the appropriateness of the risk premiums being paid in PPP 
arrangements.
In Canada, on the other hand, PPP consortia are usually unwilling to accept much 
revenue risk.65 Revenue risk depends on use (or demand) and price (tolls). Use is often 
hard to predict and can be affected by factors outside of the operator’s control, including 
government decisions. The Canada Line in Vancouver provides an example of a PPP 
project where only 10 per cent of the ridership risk on the project was transferred to the 
private sector partner. This was the case even though ridership levels exceeded the initial 
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projections. Less experienced governments seem particularly unable to transfer any revenue 
risk and often end up essentially guaranteeing private sector profits; see, for example, the 
Zagreb Wastewater Treatment Plant in Croatia, and the Horgos-Pozega Highway in Serbia. 
Vining and Boardman also found that PPP projects with minimal actual risk of low usage 
were the ones where more use-risk was transferred to the private sector.66 
Private sector operators will accept revenue risk if the PPP is taking over existing facilities, 
where historic traffic levels and toll revenues are known and are more predictable. This 
issue warrants a brief discussion, although we view these contracts more as privatizations 
than as PPPs. Long-term leases of existing toll roads in North America, Europe, Australia 
and Chile have often transferred demand risk to the private sector participants. However, 
even here, the results have been mixed. While Highway 407 in the Greater Toronto Area 
experienced traffic growth and has been highly profitable for the private sector partners, 
the operator of the Indiana Toll Road went bankrupt when traffic volumes failed to meet 
expected levels. 
Transferring demand risk to the private sector has often been contentious, because of the 
loss of public-policy flexibility that is often associated with the non-compete and toll-
escalation clauses in these contracts. In the Highway 407 case, the toll-rate escalations 
permitted in the contract resulted in numerous unsuccessful lawsuits by government to 
get the private concessionaire to drop the rates. And in the case of the State Route 91 
express toll lanes in Orange County, Calif., the desire by the state transportation agency to 
expand the highway in contravention of a non-compete clause resulted in multiple lawsuits. 
Ultimately the government bought out the private sector participant. With Canadian PPPs 
over the past decade, governments have retained flexibility by not attempting to transfer 
demand risk. For example, in a new PPP contract to extend the existing Highway 407, 
Ontario pays the facility operator to collect tolls, but retains demand risk.
Government Transaction Costs and Renegotiations
Transaction costs on PPPs can be very high. Reported transaction costs typically range 
from one to three per cent of project costs. In Ontario, governments have spent around $1.1 
billion on PPP transaction costs for 75 projects. This is estimated to be $400 million more 
than if the same projects had been delivered through traditional procurement.67 However, it 
is unclear whether these estimates cover all transactions, particularly those costs associated 
with monitoring and enforcing the PPP contract during the operating period. These costs 
can include frequent meetings between the stakeholders, extensive data collection, the 
application of complex revenue-sharing formulas, and costly dispute-resolution protocols 
or lawsuits. The line ministry or agency that provides services in a given sector typically 
takes over the management of the PPP concession from the PPP agency once construction 
is complete, and may incur costs that are not incurred by the government PPP agency that 
reports transaction costs. 
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67 
Auditor General of Ontario, “Infrastructure Ontario.”
22
Private sector participants frequently try to renegotiate contracts when they see, or can 
create, an opportunity to do so. For example, Portugal’s contract for its suburban rail 
service (the Fertagus) putatively transferred risk to the private sector participant but, when 
traffic was lower than projected, the contract had to be renegotiated, with the government 
assuming more risk.68 Other examples of disputes and lawsuits include the Canada Line, 
Highway 407 and State Route 91 Express Toll Lanes, as stakeholders sought to shift the 
costs of risk events that do occur. 
Also, as we discussed above, governments are ultimately the residual risk holder. A number 
of prominent PPPs outside of Canada have resulted in well-publicized bankruptcies. 
These include Metronet in the U.K., the South Bay Expressway in San Diego, and the 
Cross-City Tunnel in Sydney, Australia. When PPP projects get into trouble, governments 
often, though not always, assume all or a large part of the debts. In the Metronet case, for 
example, the government guaranteed 95 per cent of the loans (in a project that was 88.3 per 
cent debt financed).69 Often, such as with the toll roads in and around Madrid, governments 
have been inclined to bail out or buy out failed concessionaires, at significant cost. Taken 
together, such actions increase governments’ production costs and transaction costs, and 
diminish the benefits of PPPs. Recent Canadian PPP contracts appear to have been better in 
this regard. No project procured by a provincial or federal PPP agency over the past decade 
has gone bankrupt or required a major contract renegotiation once construction had been 
complete and the operational phase had begun.
Do PPPs Produce Net Additions to Infrastructure?
Due to public sector borrowing restrictions, governments may be unable or unwilling to 
undertake new PSA projects. However, such projects might be feasible as PPPs. Thus, 
the question arises: Have PPPs resulted in net additions to infrastructure that would not 
have occurred otherwise? Australian government executives claim that this is the case 
in Australia, where road tolls and user fees that cover the full cost of infrastructure 
service provision are more common than in many other countries.70 In reviewing the 
Irish experience, Reeves concludes that PPPs did make a contribution to infrastructure 
investments over and above that which would have occurred otherwise. However, the stock 
of Ireland’s infrastructure initially lagged that of many other EU countries, and much of 
this investment took place at a time when the country’s economy was booming and private 
financing was easily available.71
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Government Myopia or Strategic Behaviour Creating Future  
Affordability Problems
One feature of PPPs is that governments provide infrastructure today, but pay for it later. 
This strategy may be politically motivated and may “fit” with the incentives of public sector 
administrators. Whatever the reasons, the shift in the timing of governments’ payments 
can create significant “affordability” issues for future governments. This problem may 
be exacerbated by higher future annual payments flowing from higher private financing 
costs, high private sector margins, or inflation escalation clauses in the contracts. In the 
United Kingdom, Posner, Ryu and Tkachenko note that U.K. Treasury officials indicate 
that annual PFI charges for larger local governments have grown to encumber 25 per cent 
of their future operating costs, and this is beginning to pose a burden on budgets available 
for public services.72 In 2012, 22 hospital trusts in England reported that PFI debt payments 
were crowding out funds for clinical services, and one has since entered into receivership. 
And in Lesotho, payments made to the private concessionaire that built and now operates a 
new hospital in the capital, Maseru, now consume 51 per cent of the country’s health-care 
budget, though the hospital serves only a quarter of the country’s population.73 
VfM Analyses
The purported purpose of “value for money” (VfM) studies is to determine whether PPPs 
have lower whole-life costs to governments than do PSAs, measured in terms of present 
values. Many studies indicate that PPPs do provide VfM. However, one should be skeptical 
of these conclusions because they are conducted by government PPP agencies, which are 
mandated with promoting PPPs. Many scholars have questioned the accuracy, depth and 
objectivity of VfM studies.74 
There are many potential problems. First, transaction costs are likely to be underestimated, 
as PPPs require extensive internal government staff resources to manage and monitor the 
concession contract once operational. The PPP agencies doing the VfM analyses do not 
incur these costs and may not reflect them adequately in the VfM calculations. Second, 
the analyses may not compare “like with like”: that is, there may be quality differences 
between the PPP and the PSA. Third, VfM studies often use inappropriate discount rates.75 
Fourth, VfM studies often inappropriately treat risk transfer as a financial benefit or 
measure it poorly. In Ontario, risk is critical in tipping the balance of VfM in favour of the 
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PPP, but these analyses are rarely based on independent evidence of the actual experience 
of past projects.76 Fifth, some VfM studies in the U.K. over-correct for the optimism bias in 
PSA cost estimates.77 
Boardman and Hellowell show that, although many different government agencies claim 
to measure the whole-life cost to government, there are considerable differences in the 
methodologies used.78 They cannot all be correct. Indeed, Boardman and Hellowell argue 
that no jurisdiction adopts the correct method, and they explain how VfM analysis should 
be done in order to estimate value for money from the government’s financial perspective 
(e.g., Treasury’s perspective). Building on Boardman and Vining, they also discuss how 
VfM analysis should be conducted if the goal is to estimate value for money from the 
perspective of society as a whole.79 
Conclusion
Section 6 examines some of the social costs and benefits of PPPs and the distribution of 
these costs and benefits. It also considers the political impacts of PPPs. Politicians favour 
PPPs because they can, in effect, rent to own—that is deliver infrastructure now, but pay 
for it over time. Also, PPPs enable governments to transfer construction risks (in particular) 
which, when combined with other factors, leads to projects that are more likely to come in 
“on time and on budget,” providing further political benefits. In Canada and many other 
countries, revenue risk is now rarely transferred to the private sector, but is still often 
transferred in the U.S. Furthermore, analyses by PPP agencies claim to show that PPPs offer 
value for money, thereby providing an additional benefit to politicians. 
Do PPPs actually cost less than PSAs? In principle, there is no reason why a design-build 
PPP should cost the government less than a fixed-price, design-build PSA. Also, there is 
currently no evidence to suggest that PPPs benefit from economies of scope or have lower 
lifetime costs. Current VfM studies conducted by government agencies neither show 
correctly whether PPPs actually cost government less than PSAs (in net present value) 
nor do they show correctly whether PPPs provide more social welfare than PSAs. Indeed 
most VfM studies are conducted based on ex ante estimates with very little detailed ex 
post study to confirm the project outcomes. Consumer benefits (or costs) and issues of 
quality are also rarely taken into account. However, ex ante, there is often relatively little 
competition among PPP consortia, thus potentially leading to higher costs. And risk 
transfer is expensive to governments and ultimately to taxpayers. The already-committed 
future payments to PPPs are substantial. In some situations, government agencies have 
been unable to pay for PPPs and have declared bankruptcy or have been bailed out. Many 
citizens are unaware of the growing liabilities and the need for future taxes to pay for the 
PPPs. 
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Another major downside of PPPs is that they are relatively inflexible, long-term contracts 
and it is impossible to anticipate, ex ante, all possible contingencies. Thus, transaction 
costs are high. The impact on employees is mixed: in general, private sector unions are 
supportive, while public sector unions are not. In contrast, many private sector participants 
have benefitted from PPPs and, not surprisingly, are highly supportive. This set includes 
construction companies, bankers and other financiers, consultants, lawyers, etc. In short, 
the benefits are concentrated among a relatively small number of agents, while the costs are 
ultimately borne by large numbers of dispersed taxpayers.
7. THE FUTURE OF PPPS IN CANADA AND SUGGESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENTS
PPP projects are still government projects, even though private sector agents deliver and 
manage them. To reiterate, PPPs inevitably involve principal-agent relationships, as do 
any form of traditional government procurement. However, the specific nature of the 
principal-agent problems varies by contract type. PPPs were promoted as the solution to one 
particular principal-agent problem, namely moral hazard associated with non-fixed-price 
traditional procurement. But PPPs generate their own, somewhat different, principal-agent 
problems. First, all PPP contracts are complex and inflexible, which inevitably results in 
significant transaction costs. These costs do not end with certainty until the end of contract 
period, sometimes more than 30 years after the project begins. Second, in order to transfer 
risk through a fixed-price contract, government has to pay for it. We can get a fixed-price 
contract for our house renovation if we are prepared to pay a high-enough price premium. 
But, usually, this price premium is so high that we opt for the variable labour-and-materials 
contract where the price is not fixed. The private sector can be compensated to take on 
cost risks, but is often not willing to take on revenue risks as well as cost risks. It appears 
that the cost premium of incremental risk transfer increases more (i.e., non-linearly) as the 
amount of risk transfer increases. Furthermore, transaction costs may also increase at an 
increasing rate as more risk is transferred. Third, government can significantly reduce the 
moral-hazard problem of traditional non-fixed-price contracts by simply using fixed-price 
contracts (although, of course, government has to pay the certainty premium and may incur 
higher transaction costs than it would in a non-fixed-price contract).
PPP practice has certainly evolved in Canada and elsewhere. Initially, Canada, like 
the U.K., engaged in bundled DBFOM or DBFM contracts. There has been a general 
“unbundling” of various components. One concerns the transfer of revenue risk. Although 
Canadian governments have rarely transferred a lot of revenue (or demand) risk to the 
private sector, governments have accepted the reality that revenue-risk transfer is not 
feasible or is extremely expensive. A second concern is the inclusion of soft services, such 
as food and cleaning, in contracts. The U.K.’s PF2 model for future PPPs is particularly 
sensitive to maintaining greater government flexibility over the lifecycle of an asset, and as 
a result has proposed removing “soft” operational service from many PPP arrangements.80 
The third evolution concerns financing and the timing of payments to the PPP. One of the 
major disadvantages of PPPs is the higher private sector financing cost and the long-term 
nature of this financing. One response to this problem is to only tap the private sector for 
80 HM Treasury, A New Approach to Public-Private Partnerships (2012).
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short-term construction financing, which is repaid by government in full following the 
completion of the building of the project. In Canada and around the world, governments 
are becoming more willing to fund part of the upfront capital costs of PPP infrastructure 
projects or pay significant substantial completion payments to the contractor once the 
high-risk construction period is over, thereby lowering the overall financing costs of PPP 
projects. Of course, it is important to ensure that private sector investors have sufficient 
“skin in the game.” In aggregate, these changes reduce the complexity of PPP contracts and 
make them much more similar to traditional (but fixed-price) government procurement. 
Indeed, many so-called PPP contracts are substantively indistinguishable from government 
provision.
Some Policy Recommendations
Based on our above analysis and drawing on the recent work of Boardman and Vining, we 
summarize some “rules for government” to apply to PPPs.81 
Establish a Jurisdictional PPP “Regulatory-Governance Constitution.” There are 
two important elements. The first relates directly to the normative goals of government. 
Evaluation of procurement alternatives should be based on social value. Where a cost-
benefit analysis to assess social value is not feasible, governments should use minimization 
of total social costs as an evaluation criterion. Where possible, social value should be 
employed to distinguish between policy alternatives, specifically to choose between 
procuring via a PPP or a PSA. Social value should also be used to structure pricing schemes 
(including tolling). This would suggest, for example, that roads should have tolls during 
congested periods, but not during uncongested periods. Existing VfM-evaluation practices 
should be discontinued. The second element concerns transparency. In particular, there 
should be consistent and timely budget reporting on anything that has PPP characteristics. 
Furthermore, all contracts should be publicly available. 
Ensure that Evaluators and Contract Administrators have the Appropriate Skills to 
Evaluate and Manage Contracts. A particular problem with municipalities using PPPs is 
the lack of contract-management skills at that level of government. These skills are often 
better at the provincial government level in agencies such as partnerships BC. However, 
these organizations are also mandated to promote PPPs and are unlikely to provide 
unbiased evaluations. 
Separate the Analysis, Evaluation, Contract Administration and Oversight Agencies. 
Governments engaged in a program of PPPs should separate the agencies that: (1) analyze 
the desirability of projects and decide which of the alternative provisioning modes to 
employ (e.g., PSA or PPP) (2) administer the PPP contracting process and monitor the 
implementation of the contract, and (3) evaluate the overall success of projects. While it 
may be inevitable that the administering agency turns into a “political poodle” it needs to 
be flanked by “junkyard dogs.” 
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Don’t Constrain the Options. Some governments in Canada remain committed to the 
use of PPPs. In particular, the former federal Conservative government would only provide 
infrastructure funds to municipalities for certain large infrastructure projects if they 
utilized PPPs. This requirement is almost certainly an unwise and too-restrictive policy. 
It might lead to unnecessarily high lifecycle costs, bankruptcy and inefficient use of 
resources. PPP contracts should be conducted carefully and not forced as the “only game in 
town,” as PPP Canada seems to be inclined to do.
Make Bidding as Competitive as Possible. There are a number of aspects to actually 
making the bidding process as competitive as possible. Most importantly, governments and 
agencies should be proactive in generating and encouraging qualified bids. Foreign bidders 
should be encouraged, not discouraged as is quite often the case. Consortia should consist 
of firms with the necessary complementary skills, but should have as few members as 
possible to allow as much ex post contestability as possible.
Provide Partial Own-Government Financing. Governments can borrow money at a 
lower interest rate than can private sector consortia. Therefore, governments should finance 
a significant part of the design and construction costs. And, they should alter the payment 
schedule so that the private sector has less money invested for a long time period. However, 
it is important for the private sector firms to have some skin in the game throughout the 
entire contract period.
Dis-intermediate Some of the Financing. Over the past decade, institutional investors 
have come to see infrastructure as an asset class that matches their investment 
requirements, providing long-term, stable, inflation-adjusted returns.82 The large Canadian 
public sector pension funds, alongside the Australian superannuation funds, are among 
the leading institutional investors in infrastructure, owning stakes in roads, transit, power, 
water and telecommunication assets around the world. Many large Canadian funds, such 
as the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, and the 
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, have recently reported that they intend 
to increase their holdings in infrastructure assets, and smaller private sector pension funds 
are working through intermediaries to pool their funds and access large infrastructure 
deals. In practice, for the small funds, their investments in PPPs typically arise through 
the private-sector financial intermediaries that arrange the debt financing in PPPs, such as 
Macquarie Capital or James Laing Infrastructure. But, many of these institutional investors 
are quasi-public organizations. This suggests that governments could pool these funds 
directly and thereby dis-intermediate. 
Avoid Stand-Alone Private-Sector-Participant Subsidiary “Shells.” The main purpose 
of this rule is to ensure that the private sector partner or partners have sufficient equity at 
risk to give them the appropriate incentives to minimize cost and “remain in the game.” 
By forming a SPV for each PPP project, a private company minimizes the amount of its 
own (equity) capital at risk and increases the chances of opportunistic exit. If a stand-alone 
organization is formed, then the parent companies should co-sign the contract and accept 
liability.83 
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Prohibit a Private Sector Partner from Selling the Contract Too Early. There is a 
potential “bait and switch” problem. When a PPP operating contract is sold from one 
provider to another provider then the government may not know what it is really buying. 
If, for example, problems arise during the operating phase, then it may not be clear which 
private sector firm or consortium member was at fault. Not knowing who to pin the blame 
on can seriously increase government transaction costs. 
Don’t Indemnify the Bondholders. This rule may sound obvious — if only this were true 
in practice! Of course, no government enters negotiation on a PPP intending to indemnify 
private sector debt holders, but in practice this has occurred in a number of PPPs, most 
notably Metronet. 
Require Standard, Fast, Low-Cost Dispute Resolution. The purpose of this rule is to 
reduce the transaction costs from delay, negotiation and lawsuits. 
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THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL LICENCE AND ENERGY UTILITY PLANNING AND INVESTMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/issue-social-licence-and-energy-utility-planning-and-investment
Michal C. Moore | March 2016
IS SOCIAL LICENCE A LICENCE TO STALL?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/social-licence-licence-stall
Mark Lowey | March 2016
A FISCAL FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN ROMANIA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/fiscal-framework-offshore-oil-and-gas-activities-romania
Daria Crisan | March 2016
LIFTING THE HOOD ON ALBERTA’S ROYALTY REVIEW
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/lifting-hood-alberta%E2%80%99s-royalty-review
Blake Shaffer | February 2016
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW PUBLIC OUTLOOK ON THE ECONOMY AND MIDDLE-CLASS DECLINE: HOW FDI ATTITUDES ARE CAUGHT IN A 
TENTATIVE CLOSING OF THE CANADIAN MIND
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/understanding-new-public-outlook-economy-and-middle-class-decline-how-fdi-attitudes-are-caug
Frank Graves | February 2016
GIVE CANADA POST A BREAK: ALLOWING MORE PRICING FLEXIBILITY AND COMPETITION COULD HELP THE CORPORATION SUCCEED
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/give-canada-post-break-allowing-more-pricing-flexibility-and-competition-could-help-corporat
Philippe De Donder | February 2016
RATES OF RETURN ON FLOW-THROUGH SHARES: INVESTORS AND GOVERNMENTS BEWARE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/rates-return-flow-through-shares-investors-and-governments-beware
Vijay Jog | February 2016
THE FALSE PANACEA OF CITY CHARTERS? A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CASE OF TORONTO
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/false-panacea-city-charters-political-perspective-case-toronto-0
Andrew Sancton | January 2016
IS ‘CHARTER-CITY STATUS’ A SOLUTION FOR FINANCING CITY SERVICES IN CANADA — OR IS THAT A MYTH?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/%E2%80%98charter-city-status%E2%80%99-solution-financing-city-services-canada-%E2%80%94-or-myth-0
Harry Kitchen | January 2016
